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FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9613
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHMFIISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 002045

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DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN

E.O. 12958: N/A

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SUBJECT: CEASEFIRE COMMISSION UNDER UNAMID - LONGTERM PROSPECTS FOR IMPROVEMENT

REF: KHARTOUM 1957

¶11. (SBU) SUMMARY: The Ceasefire Commission (CFC) needs reform and the impending transfer of authority from AMIS to UNAMID provides the opportunity for needed change. However, significant improvement in CFC operations, which should result in better monitoring and implementation of the ceasefire, is six months to a year away. END SUMMARY.

¶12. (SBU) The CFC is currently ineffectual and suffers from the signatories' refusal to allow AMIS freedom of movement. Currently the signatories require party rep presence on all patrols. It is also ineffective because of: 1) AMIS reluctance to investigate ceasefire violations robustly; 2) the splintering of the rebel movements and proliferation of party reps at the sector and sub-sector level; 3) CFC's striving for consensus for its violation reports to the Joint Commission; and 4) the movements' reliance upon Mission Subsistence Allowance (MSA). Everyone agrees the CFC is broken, but a fix has yet to be found.

¶13. (SBU) CFC Chair and AMIS/UNAMID Force Commander GEN Agwai recently proposed several changes to improve CFC operations and effectiveness under UNAMID. He suggests consolidating signatories and non-signatories into one chamber (vice two currently) and reducing the number of reps to one per party. He further proposes that CFC reps be stationed only at the CFC headquarters in El Fasher. In addition, he recommends that MSA and all other support to the party reps be halted, including AMIS/UNAMID ID cards, sleeve badges or berets, vehicles, computers, cell phones, food and lodging.

¶14. (SBU) Reacting to Agwai's proposals, GoS Advisor to President Bashir, Nafi Ali Nafi, reportedly told Joint Special Representative (JSR) Rodolphe Adada during a meeting on December 17 that:

- The GoS does not object to stopping MSA payments under UNAMID, but insists upon the continuation of the CFC as a body;
- Any change in the composition of the CFC, even limiting it to HQ, would require a review of the DPA. The GoS does not agree to limit the CFC just to the HQ level in El Fasher and believes CFC reps should be present at all team sites; and
- The GoS wants the "Second Chamber" of the CFC for non-signatories closed. (NOTE: The GOS also continues to oppose non-signatory participation in the "First Chamber").

¶15. (SBU) JSR Adada stated that UNAMID will not pay "one penny" to any CFC member nor provide cars, phones or other equipment. He said that Force Commander Agwai will soon convene a CFC meeting to discuss the other issues and would then follow up with GoS General Mohammad Dabi. Adada also promised to call a Joint Commission meeting to discuss the future of the CFC under UNAMID.

¶6. (SBU) Note: The CFC's "founding" documents (the N'Djamena Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement and the Addis Ababa Agreement on the Modalities for Establishment of the CFC and DPA) highlight that it is supposed to have two party reps at CFC HQ and two liaison officers per party at the Ceasefire Sub-Commission in each Sector. There is no mention of reps at the sub-sector level. There is also no requirement for the MSA. The Addis Agreement, however, says "Observers participating in the monitoring, investigation and verification exercise, as well as members of the CFC, shall be funded through the budget of the CFC." Consensus on CFC reports is not needed and party reps do not have to participate in CFC investigations. The Joint Commission later created the "Second Chamber" to involve non-representatives in monitoring and verification. The Joint Commission later created the "Second Chamber" to involve non-representatives in monitoring and verification.